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Abstract
This article examines religious practices in the United States, which govern modesty
and other dress norms for men. I focus both on the spaces within which they most
collide with regulatory regimes of the state and the legal implications of these norms,
particularly for observant Muslim men. Undergirding the research are those ‘‘gender
equality’’ claims made by many religious adherents, that men are required to
maintain proper modesty norms just as are women. Also undergirding the research
is the extensive anti-Islam bias in American culture today. The spaces within which
men’s religiously proscribed dress and grooming norms are most at issue—indicated
by First Amendment legal challenges to rights of religious practice—are primarily
those state-controlled, total institutions Goffman describes, such as in the military
and prisons. The implications of gendered modesty norms are important, as state
control over religious expression in prisons, for example, is much more difficult
to contest than in other spaces, although this depends entirely on who is doing
the contesting and within which religious context. In American society today — and
particularly within the context of growing Islamaphobia following the 9/11 attacks —
the implications are greatest for those men practicing ‘‘prison Islam.’’
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Introduction
In recent years, we have seen heightened interest in the relative meanings, politics,
and mobilities behind women’s body coverings, within various spatial, historical,
and religious contexts (e.g., Falah and Nagel 2005; Gokariksel 2009; Anthony
2009). Among the many topics discussed and debated by scholars as well as popular
culture critics has been the question of whether body coverings such as the Muslim
hijab or burka signal women’s relative freedom and liberation or their opposite.
Although issues surrounding modesty and traditional dress norms for Islamic
women appear much more controversial and widespread than those of the other
monotheistic religions (see below), such issues have relevance across a wide spectrum of religious belief systems, particularly those more fundamentalist or orthodox
in orientation, such as in Hassidic Judaism and Amish Christianity (Arthur 1999).
Within such contexts, many adherents—the women who cover for religious or
doctrinal reasons as well as their devout religious leaders—are oftentimes quick
to point out that their religious texts and practices are ‘‘gender equal’’ with respect
to body covering and modesty. They assert that their holy books equally recommend
modesty norms—in body, dress, and behavior—of both women and men (Arthur
1999; Abdullah 2004; Al-Rashidi 2007; Anthony 2009). Such rules and admonitions
for proper dress and behavior rely on particular interpretations of their respective
holy books (Qur’an, Torah, and Bible), a patriarchal regime to carry them out, and
religious adherents who, for their own reasons, embrace, negotiate, or in various
ways challenge those interpretations.
This article examines such gender equality claims, considering their implications
for men, particularly Islamic men, in contemporary American society. In the discussion that follows I examine religious practices in the United States that govern modesty and other dress norms for men; the spaces within which religiously proscribed
modesty and traditional dress codes for men are most controlled, negotiated, and
contested; and the discriminatory outcomes especially for men who dress modestly
according to Islamic precepts. I consider the legal and constitutional aspects of state
regulation of the body, alongside prevalent and powerful Western iconographies of
‘‘covered’’ Islamic men that undergird and inform these legal and constitutional conflicts. Stereotyped images of Arab Muslim men as sheikhs or terrorists are common
in the US news media and in popular culture (film and television, political cartoons,
magazines, etc.), before but sharply increasing after the 9/11 attacks on the New
York World Trade Center (Shaheen 2009; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008; Smith
2010). Such images resonate with the West’s orientalist depictions of Middle Eastern Arab men outlined by Edward Said (1978, 1981, 1993) but go beyond them as
well in a more particularized and concentrated ‘‘Islamaphobia’’ (Smith 2010; Sheehi
2011). This, in turn, strongly influences the American establishment’s attitude
toward Muslim believers and particularly observant Muslim men.
As will become obvious, my sympathies align with those of scholars such as
Abu-Lughod who have attempted to shift the religious dress code ‘‘obsession’’ off
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of Islamic women alone. Abu-Lughod argues that it is time to perhaps ‘‘give up the
Western obsession with the veil and focus on some serious issues with which feminists and others should be concerned’’—both because Muslim women should be
able to dress how they want without becoming the subject of others’ critical gaze,
and because a fixation on Muslim women’s dress has the tendency to distract or misrepresent the sources of cultural tensions in the contemporary United States (2002,
785–86). Thus, in shifting the conversation to men’s religious dress and practice
(Islamic and otherwise) and to the spaces within which they are most ‘‘at issue,’’
illuminates not only the wider gender politics at work in the contemporary United
States but also the ways that religious and state regimes differently ‘‘collude’’ or
‘‘collide’’ in tandem with those gender norms (Secor 2007, 151). These topics must
be understood within the overarching popular culture context within which groups of
people are perceived and judged, which in turn impacts religious adherents’ relative
civil rights to dress and move about in ways they see fit.
In the following discussion, I draw evidence from legal cases contesting civil
rights violations, particularly those based on the First Amendment to the US Constitution that guarantees, ‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’’ Quite obviously, some forms of
religious expression are more legally protected than others and because of this,
peoples’ rights to spaces in the city, to citizenship, to everyday life, and ultimately
to religious practice itself, are different. Women and men enter religious systems and
public (and other) spaces very differently, and thus not only are there gendered ways
of being in the world, but court decisions and other regulatory regimes that control
space are defined and practiced in gendered ways. Below I dissect some of these
gendered norms and the state’s intervention in the garments and grooming practices
of men, emphasizing that ideas about appropriate women’s and men’s modesty
and/or dress are normalized and challenged in different kinds of ways, and have
varying relevance within different spaces and within different religious traditions.
That Muslim women showing visible signs of Islam may experience disciplinary
measures ‘‘on the street’’ or in centers of civic activity, while Muslim men experience similar regulation while incarcerated in prisons (both discussed below) helps us
to consider the complex ways in which religious and gender biases work together in
informing state action.
Again, such state action must necessarily be framed within a more general consideration of the perennial American blindness to non-Christian faiths and deep-set
structural racisms (Alexander 2012). Especially common and ubiquitous are stereotyped representations of Muslim and Arab men, and a corresponding extensive range
of anti-Muslim discriminatory practices that have wide-ranging effects, both big and
small—from impacts on American foreign policy and politics to job discrimination,
housing opportunities, and airport racial profiling, among many others. My attention
here, however, is focused on the detrimental effects imposed on observant Muslim
men incarcerated in American prisons—who are mostly African Americans aligned
with a particular antiracist Islam (Jackson 2005). My discussion highlights the ways
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in which social norms regarding state-controlled spaces oftentimes conflict with the
legal articulations of the same boundaries, as it is the case that differently positioned
individuals have greater or lesser access to First Amendment protections. State control
over religious expression in prisons, for example, might be much more difficult to contest via claims to First Amendment rights than in other spaces, although this depends
entirely on who is doing the contesting, and within which religious context. In American
society today, the implications are greatest for those men practicing ‘‘prison Islam.’’

Modesty and Dress Norms: Shifting the Discussion
It is axiomatic that both religious regimes and ‘‘the state’’—governments and
government agencies at a host of jurisdictional levels from the local municipality
to state legislatures to the Supreme Court—regulate norms of women’s modesty.
Civic laws prohibiting toplessness, breast-feeding in public, proper attire for public
school gym classes, and so on are familiar territory for legal debates about the discriminatory laws controlling women’s modesty in public spaces and related zoning
practices—men are permitted to remove their shirts in many public spaces, women
are not. Legal cases have especially focused on the sexualization of women’s breasts
in comparison to men’s, with litigants attempting to challenge discriminatory laws
on the basis of equal protection by gender, but they usually fail (e.g., Hera 1992).
In that general sense, women’s bodies and norms of modesty are obviously
differently regulated than men’s ‘‘on the street.’’
Much, much more could and has been said of such regulatory regimes that govern
women’s bodies, dress, and modesty. Norms that are religiously proscribed and
regulated may resonate with but also may come into conflict with state and other social
norms and controls. To take just one example, modest coverage of women’s hair is an
issue that remains a highly volatile social and political flashpoint in American cultural
politics (as well as in places such as France and the Netherlands) and is also one that
crosses Christian/Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim traditions. Michelman (1999), for
instance, describes the experiences of Roman Catholic nuns in the 1960s and 1970s
when first allowed to remove the habits covering their hair. Much has been written
about Orthodox Hassidic women’s hair as ‘‘ervah’’ (or erotic stimulus) as described
in the Torah, and the practice of covering it with wigs or scarves for modesty’s sake
(Schreiber 2003; Hartman 2007). Such norms are encouraged across religious belief
systems, though Christian and Jewish practices in the United States do not receive the
same attention and scrutiny as those of Islamic women. Kwan (2008, 657), for
instance, shows how Muslim women have been especially vulnerable to hate crimes
and discrimination since the 9/11 attacks, since those who wear distinctive attire can
be easily identified in public spaces. Of course, we also need to keep in mind that
ostensibly ‘‘religious’’ reasons to dress in certain ways do not begin to capture the
wider cultural, political, and practical reasons for which women maintain certain dress
and modesty norms, a subject other scholars have addressed (e.g., Entwistle 2000;
Secor 2002; Gokariksel 2007, 2009; Abu-Lughod 2002).
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There are hundreds of examples of US court cases to do with religious and state
regimes coming into conflict over women’s modesty, and these cover a wide range
of sites, dress, and religious practices (Ramachandran 2006). While it is not my purpose to rehearse these here, it is safe to say that the most controversial legal cases
that ‘‘make the news’’ are preponderantly to do with Muslim veiling practices. Court
cases are piling up in which Muslim women’s desire or need to be covered in public
confronts taken-for-granted clothing norms of the dominant Christian American
society. In Detroit, for instance, a Muslim woman’s car theft case was dismissed
by a district court judge for her refusal to remove the scarf covering her face when
she testified (Gorchow 2006). In another case, a Muslim woman from Florida
unsuccessfully went to court in an effort to overturn the state’s order that she reveal
her face for her driver’s license photo, something that she argued went against the
Qur’an mandate to cover her face as part of her religious obligation to dress modestly (Cosgrove 2005). This is a particularly noteworthy case, considering that
thirteen US states do not require photos on their drivers’ licenses, in deference to
drivers who have religious objections to being photographed. For these states,
though, this exception arose from arguments made by Amish and Mennonite
Christians who hold the belief that Bible teachings prevent them from being photographed (Council on Islamic-American Relations Research Center 2005, 5).
When it comes to the parameters of men’s dress and modesty norms, a different
set of resonances and conflicts can occur between the state, religious, and other
cultural regimes. It should be noted that some religiously proscribed clothing and
‘‘coverage’’ norms for men are related to modesty, like those for women, but some
are not—different religious scripts and cultural norms can also be at play. Suffice it
say that across the main monotheistic religions those admonitions for women to
maintain modest coverage of their bodies are steeped in notions about the inherent
eroticism and sensuality of women’s bodies that ostensibly distract men from prayer
and other religious practice. Conversely, admonitions governing men’s religious
dress—covering of the arms and legs, wearing yarmulkes or other head coverings,
growing beards or sidelocks, and so on—some of these are aimed at maintaining
modesty in dress but others originate out of a call to show, for example, reverence
to religious tradition or remembrance of sacred events in the past (Carrel 1999;
Al-Rashidi 2007; Vezzola 2007).
Such rules and regulations are of course highly contested and interpreted differently among various religious, ethnic, and culture groups. My purpose below is not
to uncover the underlying (and competing) religious beliefs governing these practices but rather to understand the effects of such rules and regulations as ‘‘social geographies.’’ When it comes to women’s modesty, religious and state regimes
‘‘collide’’ over a wide spatial range, from the streets to the Driver’s License Bureau,
and over a wide range of practices (women are either wearing not enough or too
much it would seem). When religious and state regimes collide legally or constitutionally over men’s religious dress norms in the United States—and they do so
often—it is most often within the context of those ‘‘total institutions’’ described

312

Men and Masculinities 16(3)

by Goffman (2000, 3–124). That is, those predominantly all-male spaces of the military and prisons where all aspects of life (‘‘sleep, play, and work’’) are conducted in
the same space and under the same authority (2000, 6). In such spaces, men have
little say over what they wear or how they wear it, and their fight to define religious
freedom has confronted a wide variety of responses from administrators, the courts,
and legislative bodies. These cases indicate a need to examine the larger context out
of which Islamic men in particular are understood within popular American culture,
and how these ‘‘translate’’ into the judicial sphere.
The next section offers a few examples of specifically religiously motivated
norms regulating men’s grooming patterns such as the growing of beards, and dress
norms such as the wearing of yarmulkes; then examines the military and especially
prison spaces within which such norms are most controlled and rights surrounding
them are most contested. The subsequent section offers analyses of popular antiArab and anti-Muslim stereotypes and prejudices that must be understood as fueling
discriminatory patterns against these religiously observant practices. I conclude with
a discussion of their net effect on prison Islam and the ‘‘hierarchy of rights’’
characteristic of the US judicial system.

Men’s Modesty, Religion, and the State
In 2005, the Virginia House of Representatives passed a bill imposing a fine on anyone wearing pants low enough to show their underwear; a law that seemed to be
mostly directed at young males suspected of criminal or gang activity (Fischer
2005; Ramachandran 2006). All sorts of spaces are marked by such patterns of shifting legal regimes of dress—spatialized dress codes—which themselves play into
individual men’s and women’s decisions to dress in particular kinds of ways (Secor
2002, 6; Gokariksel 2009).
As a starting point in considering men’s religiously motivated grooming and
dress patterns, we might question whether such norms vary or are regulated to the
same extent as those of women. On first glance, it would seem that such prohibitions
have much more to do with regulating women’s modesty, and in fact this is a common subject of scholarly debate today. As many scholars and religious adherents
have argued though, the same orthodox Christian, Muslim, and Jewish religious
communities discussed above regulate norms of men’s dress and coverage as well
as women’s (Graybill and Arthur 1999; Al-Rashidi 2007). As previously noted,
some religious admonitions governing men’s grooming and dress are aimed at maintaining modesty, while others are concerned with displaying reverence or remembrance toward religious tradition. In Hassidic Judaism, for example, some of the
parameters of men’s religiously proscribed dress norms have to do with modesty—for instance, full coverage of the body with long pants and long sleeved
shirts—but others, such as side hair locks (or hair curls), do not. For some adherents,
the practice of growing long hair and beards originates from language in the Bible,
for instance in Leviticus 19:27—‘‘Ye shall not round the corners of your heads,
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neither shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard.’’ The hair locks serve as ‘‘remembrances’’ that help the wearer ‘‘increase religious behavior’’ (Carrel 1999, 169–
170). Wearing the Jewish yarmulke (head covering or skullcap) similarly shows
respect, reverence, and honor toward God, rather than being motivated by
‘‘modesty’’ (Zimmer 1992; Rabinowitz 2007).
Offering a Christian example, Graybill and Arthur (1999, 9–29) argue that
although women’s modesty standards are considerably more scrutinized than men’s
in Amish and Mennonite communities, men must also adhere to strict, modest
grooming and dress codes. Amish men, in the interests of humility and plainness
proscribed by the religion, are to ‘‘dress simply’’ by wearing a collarless suit jacket
known as a plain suit, when attending church. For everyday, they wear clothing featuring suspenders, heavy denim, and felt or straw hats. Adult men wear full beards
and no mustache (Hamilton and Hawley 1999, 31–51). Mormon men, as well, wear
‘‘sacred dress’’—special garments to church as well as special undergarments—that
are similar to women’s and that mark their special covenant with God (Hamilton and
Hawley 1999, 45). Once they become ‘‘endowed’’ members of their congregations
(having acquired certain spiritual gifts and powers), they are expected to wear the
special garments day and night for the remainder of their lives.
The Muslim beard is a particularly contentious religious artifact. As with all such
examples of hair length, facial hair, turbans, yarmulkes, hats, dreadlocks, and so on,
the religious intention behind maintaining particular standards varies widely across
cultural and ethnic groups worldwide. (And of course, as is the case with women,
many such grooming and dress codes have nothing to do with ‘‘religion’’ at all, even
if outsiders may read them as such; see Abu-Lughod 2002; Morin and Guelke 2007.)
Generally speaking though, the Muslim beard is not meant to hide the face so as to
not arouse others; it is not a counterpart to the women’s veil. In Islam, the beard is
part of tradition and remembrance. At the orthodox extreme Al-Rashidi (2007), for
example, discusses the role of the beard under Sharia law. He quotes scholars of
Islam who write that the ‘‘beard is beautiful, it distinguishes men from women [and]
it is respectable . . . cutting the beard is ‘‘unlawful and unwarranted’’ (pp. 8–14). AlRashidi goes on to argue that the beard should remain ‘‘unfidgeted;’’ it is not to be
cut, trimmed, or plucked, and should be grown all around the cheeks and chin. The
man who grows the beard can lead prayers, ‘‘safeguards honor and respect in society,’’ and above all, is guaranteed the ‘‘promise of Allah’s love’’ (2007, 40, 46–48).

Legal Challenges: The Military and the Prison
Legal challenges to the right to adhere to religiously proscribed dress and grooming
norms such as those just described manifest a unique spatiality. In court cases
involving First Amendment protections, it is the military and especially prisons
where those protections have been most contested. While court challenges to hair
length and beard regulations in public schools and workplaces also appear with regularity, these generally rest on free speech arguments, not on those of the
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establishment cause and freedom of religion (Ramachandran 2006). Searches of
electronic databases of legal cases over roughly the last half century (primarily
LexisNexis and FindLaw); scholarly works by and about legal experts (e.g., Moore
1995; Solove 1996; Ramachandran 2006); and from examination of government and
civil libertarian documents (e.g., United States Commission on Civil Rights 2008;
American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] National Prison Project 2005); all point
to prisons and militaries as those spaces within which men’s religious dress norms
are most controlled and contested. The cases highlighted here represent some of the
main, precedent-setting lawsuits addressing men’s religious right to dress and groom
themselves in doctrinally defined ways, and as such, it should be noted, are suggestive
of the hundreds of cases at many jurisdictional levels rather than exhaustive of them.
And of course, the military and prisons are, for the most part, not only maledominated spaces to begin with, but especially in the case of American prisons,
comprised of grossly disproportionate numbers of minority men. Seventy percent of
the US inmate population are African American or Latino, and approximately
two-thirds of African American men in their twenties are either incarcerated, on
parole, or on probation (Peck 2003, 226; Alexander 2012). How far do these
already-marginalized men’s First Amendment rights go when entering such special
state-controlled spaces? One basic question is whether there are distinct parallels governing men’s dress and grooming practices across the main religious systems; and if
so, where and to what extent do these become civil rights issues—for instance, in cases
where prisoners have been forced to shave their beards or cut their hair in direct contradiction of their attempts to adhere to religious principles. And how do these then
align with the gender biases of both religious and state regulatory regimes?
A landmark US Supreme Court case in which religious and state regimes collided
with respect to men’s religious dress was Goldman v. Weinberger (1986). Frequently
cited in subsequent litigation, the case involved an Orthodox Jew and ordained
Rabbi who was ordered not to wear his yarmulke while on duty in uniform as a commissioned officer in the Air Force. Facing a court martial, Goldman brought action
against the Air Force, claiming that the regulation preventing him from wearing the
yarmulke infringed upon his First Amendment freedom to exercise his religious
beliefs (Sheleff 1987). The case went through several courts and appeals. The
Supreme Court eventually decided against him in a 5-4 vote upholding the military
provision against the wearing of religious apparel that is visible, though acknowledging that their ruling infringed upon Goldman’s ability to practice his religion. The
court argued that, ‘‘the first amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices as wearing a yarmulke in the face of its view that it would detract
from the uniformity sought by dress regulations.’’
The judges writing in favor of the military made it clear that under the circumstances, ‘‘courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest.’’
Today, this case stands for the proposition that the military may burden the constitutional rights of its members with a minimum of interference from the courts. The
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First Amendment normally would require the government to give a good reason why
Goldman’s yarmulke interfered with military effectiveness. Instead, something
called the deference doctrine allowed the military to assert, without evidence, that
it was a serious problem if Air Force personnel did not all look the same—and this
from a military that permits many different kinds of ‘‘uniform’’ headgear (Mazur
2003). Such cases not only illustrate religious and state regimes colliding but point
to the potential for gender discrimination as well. In the United States v. Lugo
(2000), a military court of appeals upheld a Marine Corps regulation that prohibited
marines from wearing earrings. The court based their decision on Goldman (the need
for uniformity in dress), but according to Vojdik (2002, 265), their reasoning was
more likely based on the notion that earrings feminized men.
Though such military cases are important and contentious sites of First Amendment litigation, most such challenges have been brought against US prisons. (This is
understandable, considering that military service in the United States today is on a
voluntary basis.) While acknowledging the many and complex layers of jurisdictions
and laws in play, a sampling of precedent setting and well-known court cases allows
for an understanding of the main points upon which religion and state regulatory
regimes collide in prison spaces.
Generally speaking, prisons need compelling reasons to substantially burden an
inmate’s religious expression and are supposed to employ ‘‘the least restrictive means’’
if doing so. Typically, regulations infringing upon inmates’ religious freedom can be
upheld if the government can provide compelling and legitimate ‘‘penological interest’’
by the regulation, for instance, those that are justified in the name of safety and security
(Lewisburg Prison Project [LPP] 2005, 1–3; ACLU National Prison Project 2005;
Moore 1995). Prisoner rights are thus always balanced against ostensible administrative
interests. Moreover, the courts have determined that any religious dress or grooming
code at issue must be deemed absolutely obligatory by the religion—asserting ‘‘a central tenet test’’ for the practice. Solove (1996, 459) argues that this restriction incorrectly
views religion as a set of clear, incontestable commands that are not open (as they indeed
are) to myriad interpretations. Practitioners of the same religion, even within the same
place and sect, can disagree about what is central or essential.
Cases involving religious reverence for hair length and beards have been particularly at issue in the courts.1 More often than not, prison regulations requiring an
inmate to cut his hair or shave his beard have been upheld as constitutional, reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Although Burgin v. Henderson
(1976) set the precedent for guaranteeing the right of a prisoner to wear a beard if
done so for religious reasons (Moore 1995, 93), courts at all levels have increasingly
deferred to prison authorities and their assertions regarding the need to maintain
security and safety. In Pollock v. Marshall (1988), a US district court cited the need
for quick identification and search of inmates, prevention of hiding contraband, sanitation problems, and reducing the number of assaults by ‘‘predatory homosexuals’’
as legitimate reasons for prohibitions against long hair on the face or head (Solove
1996, 469; Rachanow 1998).
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In Green v. Polunsky (2000), Louis Ray Green challenged the Texas Board of
Criminal Justice on the basis that the prison’s grooming policy infringed upon his
religious freedom—that the wearing of a beard was a tenet of his Muslim faith—noting meanwhile that such exceptions are made for medical reasons. The court upheld
the prison grooming policy that required inmates to keep their hair short and faces
clean-shaven, arguing that the policy was constitutional since it did not prevent
Green from all means of expressing his faith. The court went on to say that grooming
policies are necessary for identification, as without them prisoners could change
their appearance with ease and guards would have difficulty identifying them; additionally that contraband such as drugs and weapons can be hidden in long beards and
hair, and guards conducting searches for such items would be put at risk. When it
was noted that Mr. Green only wanted to grow a beard one-fourth inch long and that
such a beard could not hold contraband, nor would it change his looks to any great
extent, still the court held in accordance with several earlier Supreme Court decisions which argued that beards of any length can change one’s appearance, and also
that beards and hairstyle are used by inmates to signal gang affiliation (Rachanow
1998). The court further asserted that if they allowed the beard in this case, many
more prisoners would assert religious reasons for the growing of beards, and the
prison would then be in the untenable position of trying to determine whose professed religious beliefs were ‘‘legitimate.’’
There is, as it turns out, a wide range of differences on the issue of ‘‘religious
beards’’ in prison. A survey of forty-five state prisons revealed that twenty-three
allowed beards while twenty-two did not (Solove 1996, 469). Some courts have
found the ostensible security issues to be exaggerated. In 2004, a California district
court decided in favor of a group of male Muslim inmates (Mayweathers v. Terhune)
who wanted to wear half-inch beards in accordance with their faith. The court noted
that identification concerns in other cases were exaggerated, since half-inch beards
did not pose the same identification problems as long beards. Additionally, the
beards were subject to daily inspection, eliminating security concerns (LPP 2005, 4).
A number of well-known court cases have arisen over men’s hair length in nonMuslim cases as well. In Cole v. Flick (1985), a US district court upheld a prison’s
hair regulation that infringed on the free exercise rights of a Cherokee Indian to
grow his hair long (Solove 1996, 469). By comparison, Vezzola (2007, 196) notes
that several courts found that prison bans on long hair violate the religious rights of
Native American men who regard their long hair ‘‘as a sense organ, a manifestation
of being, and a symbol of growth.’’ Prison interest has not been seen as compelling
in such cases, especially since prisons allow women to wear their hair long. In general, the courts at all levels have not tended to distinguish between regulations that
are necessary and those that are simply convenient. For instance, in a case brought
by a Rastafarian, a US circuit court in 1990 struck down the need for a prisoner to
shave his dreadlocks for identification purposes, arguing that pulling his hair back
rather than cutting it would be sufficient for identification (Solove 1996, 481;
Rachanow 1998).
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As with regulations on facial hair and hair length, regulations concerning dress,
especially restrictions on headwear, are typically upheld if a prison can demonstrate ‘‘legitimate penological interest’’ for the regulation. In Young vs. Lane
(1992, cited in LPP 2005, 5), a US circuit court upheld a prison regulation that prohibited Jewish inmates from wearing yarmulkes outside their cells, citing security
reasons such as the hiding of contraband or signaling gang affiliation. In similar
cases in Colorado in 2004 (Benning v. Amideo) and in Georgia in 2007 (Boles v.
Neet), observant Jews have sued prisons for denying their requests to wear religious garments—yarmulke and/or tallit katan (a fringed garment worn under or
over other clothing) —while in prison and during transport. The plaintiff eventually prevailed in the first case, and the second is awaiting a decision on an appeal
filed by the state of Georgia.
Likewise, in Aqeel v. Seiter (1991, cited in LPP 2005, 5), the court ruled that even
if the Muslim faith required men to wear a tarboosh (close-fitting hat), the mandatory removal of it in dining halls or in front of disciplinary boards was constitutional.
The court further found that removal of the tarboosh was necessary to inhibit weapons transfer, for sanitation purposes, and to ‘‘show respect.’’ However, the court had
allowed the wearing of baseball caps at all times, which called into question their
reasoning (Solove 1996, 459). Another US circuit court found against a Texas male
inmate (Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 1992), upholding a regulation that restricted
Muslim inmates’ wearing of Kufi caps (a type of knitted skull cap), after a lengthy
evidentiary hearing at which prison officials argued that weapons such as shanks and
razor blades could be easily secreted inside the caps.
According to the United States Commission on Civil Rights (2008, 19–22), of the
grievances filed across US federal and state prisons, grooming and head covering
issues were among the top five categories of religious grievances (the others had
to do with programming, dietary concerns, access to religious items, and lack of chaplains of one’s own faith). All tolled, religious grievances accounted for 4 percent of
all grievances filed by prisoners from 2001 to 2007; inmates prevailed in only 6 percent of those cases; and the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs were male and
Muslim (2008, 80–81). Moore (1995, 83–97) provides an overview of the several
issues around which First Amendment protections for Muslim prisoners specifically
have been argued in the courts; in addition to grooming and dress these have
included rights to special diets and religious assembly, literature, and clerics.
When a prison receives federal funding, it is subject to provisions of the amended
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) passed by Congress in 1993 (and
amended in 2000 as the RLUIPA, Religious Land Use Institutionalized Persons Act)
as well as the First Amendment protections for free exercise of religion. The RFRA
provisions were meant to dramatically increase prisoners’ religious freedom, since
in the decades preceding passage of the law the courts had been faced with many
constitutional challenges from Native Americans, Muslims, and Buddhists (Solove
1996, 467). But because so much prison regulation is designed around Christian
traditions (Solove 1996, 459), the new RFRA regulations mainly served Roman
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Catholic, Protestant, and, to an extent, Jewish prisoners, meanwhile thwarting the
practice of Islam, ostensibly in favor of penological interests.
Thus, the court cases cited here involving the rights of observant incarcerated
men alert us to some similarities across religious systems when they encounter state
systems of regulation but also require us to examine differences among them as well.
Most important perhaps is to recognize some of the crucial differences that exist
between how traditional Jewish and Muslim systems are perceived and treated
within American culture by white Christian authorities, and therefore the relative
frequency with which they are subject to contestations in the courts. Bearded Orthodox Jewish men, wearing long sleeves and their heads covered by hair locks or yarmulkes, are not stigmatized and vilified in the ways that Orthodox Muslim men can
be (Smith 2010; Bukhari et al. 2004; Kidd 2009), nor do they appear as litigants in
prison court dockets to the extent that Muslim men do (United States Commission on
Civil Rights 2008; Moore 1995). Men in traditional Jewish dress are arguably more
often associated with the horrific, traumatic iconography of the Holocaust. A much
different story emerges for observant Muslim men, a subject to which I turn in the
next section.

Legal Challenges in Context: Islamaphobia as ‘‘Orientalism
on Steroids’’
The legal- and state-administrative aspects of men’s rights to dress in religiously
observant ways cannot be detached from historical and contemporary social perspectives that fuel both racial–ethnic and religious prejudices about Arab and Muslim
identities and practices. The postcolonial critic Edward Said, in many of his works
but especially in Orientalism (1978), Covering Islam (1981), and Culture and
Imperialism (1993), offered ways of examining anti-Arab and anti-Muslim discourses and patterns across the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries in
France, Britain, and the United States that subsequent authors have usefully
expanded upon (below). Briefly, in these works, Said focused on the West’s distorted view of the Middle East and Arab world, drawing evidence from an array
of novelists, poets, journalists, politicians, historians, and travelers. His thesis of
orientalism focused on the totalizing essentialism, ethnocentrism, and racism
embedded in studies of the Orient, contesting, among other things, the widespread
caricature of Arab people as barbarians, villains, and terrorists (Morin 2010, 338).
In Orientalism (1978), he convincingly showed that, though a series of oppositions,
the Orient/East was systematically represented in Western discourses as irrational,
despotic, static, and backward, in contrast to the rational, democratic, dynamic, and
progressive Occident/West. Covering Islam (1981) and Culture and Imperialism
(1993), among other contributions, showed how the US media and federal government’s foreign policy worked together in an orientalist fashion in the late twentieth
century. Said argued that journalists’ and others’ uninformed reports were devoid of
historical contextualization (such as US involvement in Iran prior to the hostage
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takeover in 1979, including helping train Iran’s secret police), and simply reinforced
images of Islamic barbarism and terrorism in contrast to ostensible American innocence, heroism, and democratic ways of life.
Said’s works helped spark wide-ranging and comprehensive examinations of discourses of colonialism, imperialism, and empire within many historical contexts and
many disparate places. Relevant for my purposes here are the insights of scholars
who have specifically advanced the study of the negative and hostile stereotyping
of Arab Muslims across a broad spectrum of US news media and in popular culture
today, including in film, television shows, political cartoons, magazines, YouTube
videos, and advertisements. Said and his successors have shown that such stereotypes and caricatures predated the 9/11 attacks in New York by well over a century,
but many have noted their sharp increase after the attacks as well (Shaheen 2009;
Kidd 2009; Bukhari et al. 2004; Smith 2010; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008;
Jackson 2010). Shaheen (2009), in his comprehensive Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People, identifies negative stereotypes of Arab Muslims in over
1,000 American popular American movies produced throughout the twentieth century, and Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008) and Jackson (2010) study wide-ranging
sets of demonizing and demeaning political cartoons in news outlets. Arab Muslims
in these and other media appear as tribal, backward, patriarchal, lecherous and
untrustworthy, dangerous, and violent. Shaheen (2009, 14–43) identifies both the
generalized ‘‘Arab-land’’ setting of American films (deserts, camels, harems, etc.)
and caricatures of people who populate them—the vast proportion of whom are
villains. To Shaheen (2009, 32), believing one is acquiring knowledge of people and
place by watching such films would be tantamount to acquiring ‘‘accurate knowledge of Africans by watching Tarzan movies, or [of] Americans after watching films
about serial killers.’’ Smith (2010, 188–9) concurs, adding that these and other
portrayals have historically evolved from ‘‘fools and knaves to oil-rich sheikhs with
beards and huge bellies (and harem girls in the background), and now [to] machinegun toting terrorists and suicide bombers.’’
These stereotypes not only pivot off of the uncontextualized actions of a tiny
number of jihadists (Smith 2010, xiii; whose parallels, not incidentally, can be found
in Christianity and Judaism) but also often rest on a systematic but misguided popular American conflation of ‘‘Muslim ¼ Arab ¼ Middle Easterner.’’ Indeed, most of
the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims are neither Arab nor live in the Middle East (but
rather in Indonesia, India, and Malaysia); only 12 percent of the world’s Muslims
are Arab (Shaheen 2009, 10). The 6–8 million American Muslims represent a great
range of languages, cultures, movements, and ideologies. They range from foreignborn first generation immigrants, to American-born of immigrant heritage, to ‘‘indigenous’’ Muslim converts—approximately 40 percent are African American (Smith
2010, xiii, 51–77; Jackson 2005, 18; see below). And as Shaheen (2009, 9) reminds
us, prior to World War I, nearly all Arabs immigrating to the United States were
Christians, and the majority of Arab Americans today are also Christians (60 percent). All of this said, ‘‘covered’’ Arab men, relentlessly portrayed in the media
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as either threatening or cartoonish and wearing turbans and beards, has come to represent Islam itself (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008, 52–3). By contrast, Diouf (2004,
272–3) observes that American Muslims of West African descent do not ‘‘look’’
Muslim in the American popular imagination—many wearing large, embroidered
flowing robes rather than veils and skullcaps—so they come to symbolize ‘‘Africa’’
not Islam and thus have not been associated with terrorism and religious
fundamentalism.
Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008), Smith (2010), and Sheehi (2011) all identify
the contemporary anti-Muslim and anti-Arab stereotyping of Islam in America as
‘‘Islamaphobia,’’ an all-encompassing set of fear-instilling images and beliefs about
Muslims that have real-world impacts. Sheehi (2011, 38–9) argues that orientalism
paved the way for Islamaphobia, but that they are not the same thing: Islam was only
one cultural trait of the ethnically and racially defined Arab Orient (read: Semitic
and brown), whereas Islamaphobia focuses on the Islamic religion, even if the
broader perception is that Arabs are Muslims: ‘‘Islamaphobia in North America is
Orientalism on steroids’’ (Sheehi 2001, 38–9).
The effects of this ‘‘Orientalism on steroids,’’ especially on visibly ‘‘covered’’
American Muslim men, are far reaching and wide ranging. Sheehi (2011, 31–2)
describes the latent mainstreaming of Islamaphobia before 9/11 that allowed more
vitriolic versions and actions to take hold more recently, ‘‘circulated in order to naturalize and justify U.S. global, economic and political hegemony.’’ These include
large-scale discriminatory effects such as systematic surveillance, deportations,
incarcerations, torture, and executions of Arab Muslims (such as at Guantanamo; see
Agamben 2005). Kidd (2009, 161–3) uncovers the deep roots of anti-Muslim bias of
conservative Christian Evangelicals, which inflame justifications for war, American
foreign policy alignment with Israel, and ‘‘end time’’ scenarios centering on a battle
between Christianity and Islam. But Islamaphobia inflames everyday acts of discrimination and violence as well—common effects that are experienced everyday
in the lives of American Muslims. Muqtedar Khan (2004, 100) shows how the demonization of Islam in the media makes the practice of Islam in the ‘‘public square’’
dangerous: historically in the United States ‘‘men [have] faced discrimination for
wearing beards and caps and for wanting a longer break on Fridays to offer the congregational Friday prayers.’’ Such discriminations have included racial profiling,
harassment, hate speech, job discrimination, anti-Muslim rants on nationally syndicated television and radio shows, and crimes of violence and vandalism such as mosque bombings (Smith 2010, 188–9; Sheehi 2011, 32).
The above discussion illustrates the pressing need to come to terms with the widespread anti-Muslim bias in the contemporary United States, in general but also specifically as it relates to constitutionally guaranteed rights to the practice of one’s
religion. Though racial and religious bias in public has particular salience for Arab
American men generally, that bias carries enormously into the more secreted spaces
of the prison, with implications for men behind bars who are denied their rights to
dress and groom in ways proscribed by their religious beliefs. In the next section,
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I conclude with a discussion of ‘‘prison Islam’’ and the many ways in which the
largely invisible population of African American Muslim men behind bars belies
a ‘‘hierarchy of rights’’ in the contemporary United States.

Discussion: Prison Islam and a Hierarchy of Rights
A number of scholars writing about the current crisis in the American penal system
have focused on the conditions of confinement with respect to religious freedom
(Magnani and Wray 2006; Vezzola 2007; Hamm 2009). The prison takes on particularly meaningful expressions of religiosity for men who are converted within its
walls and whose bodies then become sanctified through religious dress and behaviors (El Guindi 1999). But as Secor points out, while religious dress is a ‘‘discipline
and a way of becoming a moral subject through practice, a way of becoming a subject’’ (2007, 154); such dress is not simply or only ‘‘self-expression.’’ To reduce the
conversation to religious obligation ‘‘fail[s] to capture the lived complexity of particular dressing—how it is experienced, enacted, and given meaning by those who
negotiate the rules for their own ends’’ (Secor 2007, 154). Religious dress can also
be a way of constructing group boundaries and sociocultural identities. Religious
(and other) dress must be understood as an everyday spatial practice that acquires
meaning within historically and socially situated conditions of its production and
within wider relations of social power (Secor 2002, 6–8; Entwistle 2000, 39). With
Secor, we must recognize the complexity of these and other related issues—including that the meaning of ‘‘religion’’ itself as an epistemological category is contested
(Morin and Guelke 2007, xxii) and that a straightforward semiotic reading of any
religious dress or grooming practice is highly problematic (Secor 2007, 154; i.e., the
same piece of clothing could have different meanings to different wearers). Nonetheless, it is also clear that self-identified religious men, whose dress and behavior
might indeed produce myriad definitions of the self and multiple ways of being
within the world, are also subject to state and other regulatory regimes that can and
do often collide with their rights to religious practice.
Such issues become especially relevant for incarcerated men who align with
Islam and whose religious conversion while in prison takes on a particular attachment to formal outward rituals and signs of piety (as opposed to those inner spiritual
beliefs and enactments of values that are also part of religious practice; see Secor
2002, 15–17). Of the 2.4 million people behind bars in American correctional facilities today, two-thirds of them claim a religious affiliation, and of the many who seek
religious conversion while incarcerated, 80 percent turn to Islam (Hamm 2009, 270;
also see Smith 2010, 120). Islam is the fastest growing religion among prisoners in
Western nations, and roughly 35,000 inmates in the United States, mostly African
American, are converts to Islam (Smith 2010, 119). The US Department of Homeland Security has argued that prisons have thus become ‘‘universities’’ for radical
Islamic terrorist recruitment, while the Department of Justice recently warned the
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Federal Bureau of Prisons that Islam poses a ‘‘radicalization’’ threat to national
security as well as to prison security (Hamm 2009; Smith 2010, 116–9).
Such views have obviously adverse implications for inmates who attempt to
secure their First Amendment rights to religious practice outlined in a previous section. Hamm argues, moreover, that research does not support the theories emerging
from the Department of Justice or Homeland Security. Research has preponderantly
shown that the typical US prisoner who converts to Islam is ‘‘a poor, black American, upset about racism, not Middle East politics—someone who became a Muslim
to cope with imprisonment, not to fulfill a religious obligation to Osama bin Laden’’
(Hamm 2009, 271; also see Sheehi 2011, 38). Such prisoners may be politicized
within an antiracist American Islam that carries historical ties to the Nation of Islam
and Malcolm X (DeCaro 1996; Jackson 2005), but this is nonetheless a quite different scenario than that portrayed by Homeland Security.
Sherman Jackson elaborates on this relationship in his foundational book, Islam
and the Blackamerican (2005). Jackson explains the origins of Islam as an indigenous ‘‘Blackamerican’’ religion that flourished well before numbers of foreign-born
brought their own version of Islam following the repeal of the 1965 immigration
Quota Act. (Black Muslim communities did exist earlier, including those coming
with the first slave ships, but most of their descendants converted to Christianity;
Smith 2010, 51–2.) Jackson notes that a significant divide exists in America between
Blackamerican Muslims and the Islam of more recent first- and second-generation
immigrants. This, in terms of class—most of the latter are better educated professionals; in terms of race—most of the latter are legally defined as ‘‘white,’’ even
if they have been treated as nonwhite since the 9/11 attacks; as well as in terms
of theology and practice, the latter of which, to Jackson, hold a ‘‘virtual monopoly’’
over how the religion is defined and constituted in America (2005, 5–17). Jackson
helps us understand how Blackamerican Islam holds a particular salience among
predominantly African American prisoner communities, whose Muslim identities
are part of a protest by people disaffected from the dominant Christian majority and
who seek to combat its racism. These men, it must be underlined, are thus subject to
the fallout of both anti-Islamic bias of the dominant culture—albeit one that is
informed by anti-Arab xenophobia—but also the structural racism that disproportionately produces African Americans as a majority of the US inmate population in the
first place.
Hamm argues that Islam can thus be understood as playing a major role in prisoner rehabilitation: ‘‘Once on the path to restructuring their lives—down to the way
they eat, dress, form support systems and divide their day into study, prayer and
reflection—Muslim prisoners have begun the reformation process, making them less
of a recruiting target for terrorists than other prisoners’’ (2009, 669; also see Jenkins
2003, 5). Smith (2010, 119) agrees, arguing that prison guards and other personnel
are aware that Muslims who observe the discipline of the faith and stand by its moral
code are less likely to ‘‘cause trouble’’ than other inmates, and so guards have often
tried to support and encourage rather than obstruct their practice of Islam. To Smith,
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the attraction of prison Islam ‘‘seems to be its egalitarianism, sense of brotherhood,
and emphasis on self-discipline and devotion.’’ A convert adopts an Islamic name and
begins to wear whatever form of dress is allowed in a given facility . . . participation
in communal prayers and other Islamic activities helps solidify the new convert’s
sense of identity and belonging. . . . Personal modesty and cleanliness become of
primary importance, as does one’s general appearance, with all efforts made to
demonstrate that one has entered the community of Islam (Smith 2010, 120).
Smith argues further that the language of Muslims in prison has shifted away
from the rhetoric of a separatist Nation of Islam to one emphasizing American citizenship. Inmates, to her, are claiming their rights as American citizens, which
include the right to practice one’s faith (2010, 121).
Still, as Smith and many others concede, Muslim converts incarcerated in US
prisons still do not receive religious rights equal to those of other faiths, as evidenced
by trends seen in the court cases discussed above. The fact that elite, white Protestant
men have made most of the rules governing American society (including the First
Amendment itself) explains why we do not see, for example, lines of Episcopalian
men going to court to protect their religious rights to dress in particular kinds of
ways, in prison or elsewhere (Mazur 1999). Indeed, because so much prison regulation was designed by white Christians and around Christian traditions (Mazur 1999),
it is not surprising that Muslim men would have a difficult time both practicing their
religion while incarcerated and securing their First Amendment protections to maintain religiously proscribed dress and grooming norms to do so. Courts allowing the
‘‘all-American’’ baseball cap in prison but not the Muslim tarboosh or Kufi cap—
which cover the head in similar fashion and degree—illustrate this well.
As the suggestive (rather than exhaustive) legal cases outlined in a previous section illustrate, religious admonitions for Islamic men to dress and groom in observant ways are mostly colliding with the state’s regulatory regimes in the post 9/11
United States, although adherents of other non-Christian faiths also suffer constitutional infringements. In essence the practice of Islam in prison has been thwarted, in
favor of ostensible penological interests. The notion that ‘‘prison Islam’’ poses a particular danger to national security often serves as the unstated backdrop to prison
civil rights cases involving religious practice today. And these, again, are fueled and
reinforced by a host of media and other popular culture anti-Muslim biases that drift
into official administrative positions and regulations.
Questions of gender and religious practice have particular salience within discussions of law and space, as the above examples illustrate—and this, regardless of
whether the dress or grooming code is tied to ‘‘modesty,’’ ‘‘remembrance,’’ or something else. There are significant differences in the state’s approach to religious
women and religious men and these carry a particular ‘‘spatial logic’’ inscribed in
gendered religious practices. Evidence from First Amendment lawsuits demonstrates that religious women and men are ‘‘disciplined’’ by the state in different
spaces. One explanation for this lies at the intersection of sexism and racism in both
American religious practice and courts of law. Both religious and state regulatory
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regimes illustrate a type of ‘‘collusion’’ of gender bias when it comes to modesty and
dress norms, as both attempt to heighten gender differences and solidify gendered
identities of both women and men. Prisons allow women to wear long hair, for
instance, but not men. And yet again, the example of the Muslim woman in Florida
who refused to unveil for a driver’s license photo (Cosgrove 2005) can be usefully
juxtaposed with the question of Muslim beards in prison—both are attempts by the
state to render the subject knowable for the purposes of discipline, and both are cases
of anti-Muslim bias.
The above examples illustrate what we might call a ‘‘hierarchy of rights’’—various degrees of success with instruments such as First Amendment lawsuits—for
both religious men and religious women, based on gender as well as race, both Arab
and Black. This hierarchy is formulated around a complicated orientalist and Islamaphobic cultural mechanism deeply rooted in many Americans’ imaginations and
their prevalent stereotyping of Muslim men and women.
Islam in particular grates against the US court system in different spaces and in
gendered ways, with men disproportionately represented in the state’s total institutions whose authority is especially difficult to challenge (Jackson 2005; Goffman
2000; Peck 2003). Much of the literature on spaces of political dissent deals with
access to and appropriation of public space. Much more analysis is needed on dissent
within institutionalized spaces. Civil rights issues surrounding them are only going
to become more contentious and call for further place-based understandings of how
religions discipline and regulate women and men differently, and how religious
ideologies and practices resonate with or come into conflict with those of the state.
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respective areas unless the Supreme Court ‘‘generalizes’’ a district ruling (rather than simply upholds it). The District and Circuit court cases discussed in this section include US
Second Circuit Court, Burgin v. Henderson, 1976; US Sixth District Court, Pollock v. Marshall, 1988; US Fifth District Court of Appeals, Green v. Polunsky, 2000; US District
Court in California, Mayweathers v. Terhune, 2004; US Third District Court, Cole v. Flick,
1985; US Seventh Circuit Court, Young v. Lane, 1992; US Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Boles v. Neet, 2007; US Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Benning v. Amideo, 2004; US
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